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Defending Punishment: Reply to Critics 
Thom Brooks 
 
Introduction 
I am very grateful to the contributors for this symposium for their essays on my Punishment 
book. Each focuses with different elements of my work. Antony Duff examines the definition 
of punishment in my first few pages.
1
 Michelle Madden Dempsey analyses the importance 
given to coherence in my account and critique of expressivist theories of punishment.
2
  
Richard Lippke considers my statements about negative retributivism in an important new 
defence of that approach.
3
 I examine each of these in turn below. While I do not change my 
position, they draw attention to certain features in my overall argument worth reflecting on at 
greater length. So I welcome this opportunity to address and clarify these now and grateful 
for their helping me to rethink my original arguments. 
Duff on definitions 
Duff begins the symposium challenging the definition of punishment that starts my book, 
citing my proposed definition: 
(1) Punishment must be for breaking the law. 
(2) Punishment must be of a person for breaking the law. 
(3) Punishment must be administered and imposed intentionally by an authority with 
a legal system. 
(4) Punishment must involve a loss.4 
My purpose is to define and clarify what is meant by the term ‘punishment’ in my book. This 
definition should make clear that my use of ‘punishment’ is restricted to the breaking of law 
by individuals administered and imposed intentionally by an authority involving a loss within 
a legal system. So my aim is to consider punishment as a legal practice and examine its 
justification.  
This aspect is important. Part of my argument is that too many discussions about 
punishment fail to connect punishment with crime. It is true we often hear talk about 
‘punishing’ a child for misbehaviour, but I argue this talk is metaphorical and that such a 
practice is different from our legal practices—and these legal practices are my focus. Either 
there is nothing distinctive about ‘legal punishment’ versus talk of punishment in other 
contexts, or this difference matters and I claim that it does.  
 Duff first denies that punishment must be for breaking the law. He says:  
A range of institutions—including schools, universities, religious organisations, many 
kinds of business, professional associations—operate with codes of ethics or 
discipline, and with officers or committees who are authorised to impose punishments 
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on those who violate them: what is imposed can count as a punishment only if it is 
purportedly imposed for the commission of a specified offence, and is imposed by 
someone with the authority to do so.
5
 
At first glance, readers might think Duff and I agree: punishments are only imposed where 
someone has committed an offence. But notice how Duff makes this point about punishments 
by changing what is meant by offences: Duff’s reference to ‘a specified offence’ is to some 
breach of a code of ethics and not crime. It is hardly surprising that Duff rejects my narrower 
focus as he counts as an ‘offence’ more than unlawful conduct and counts as ‘punishment’ 
more than actions connected to unlawful conduct. His understanding of possible crimes and 
punishments is over-inclusive and goes beyond the criminal law and sentencing policy.  He 
refers to ‘many other punitive contexts’ and their ‘disciplinary code’ leading him to claim we 
need not consider as offences conduct that is ‘defined as criminal by the law’.6 Duff’s non-
legal understanding of offences and their punishment is intended to demonstrate that my 
narrower focus on criminal law and sentencing is incorrect, but all Duff does here is use one 
definition to refute another.
7
 
Duff next claims that ‘careful definers’ of punishment note it must be of an alleged 
offender for alleged offences.
8
 He disagrees with my statement that punishment is ‘of a 
person for breaking the law’.9 Duff claims it is ‘an odd restriction’ because it demands that 
punishment be justified and ‘it forbids us to object that punishment is unjust when it is posed 
on an innocent person; such impositions, on the Brooks definition, do not count as 
punishments’ and so cannot be condemned as such.10 Duff claims we should distinguish 
between whether what we do to another is punishment and whether it is justified. 
But this is an odd criticism. We don’t punish people alleged to have committed a 
crime, but persons convicted for it. Curiously, Duff appears to argue that something counts as 
punishment if its definition is aimed at the guilty ‘and must be of the actual guilty’ even 
where the person punished is innocent, but wrongly sentenced. This is odd because it 
commits Duff to accepting that (positive) retributivists—that require offenders possess desert 
in order to justify punishment—would claim that any wrongfully convicted persons are 
punished despite their innocence. Desert does not only justify the amount of punishment to be 
distributed, but the distribution itself. Perhaps our disagreement is that Duff calls imprisoning 
innocent people a form of unjust punishment and I would call it a miscarriage of justice: 
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punishment would be not merely normatively inadequate, but should never have happened. 
We can agree innocent people endure some form of loss perhaps, but my point remains: 
punishments are not to be understood or justified isolated from the offences that give rise to 
them—so this important link between crime and punishment is absent where the innocent are 
concerned. The criminal justice system does indeed send innocent people to prisons, but they 
are neither deserved, rehabilitated, etc. because what they endure is not punishment but 
injustice. And this gives rise to justified rights to make claims for compensation in 
recognition they did not receive justice. 
Duff considers my comments on punishment and loss. He is critical of my brief note 
that a violent psychopath tempted to kill without provocation might be incapacitated on my 
unified theory of punishment ‘regardless of culpability’.11 Duff initially states concerns about 
we should count someone’s detention as punishment where they lack culpability. Of course, 
someone need not be culpable to be convicted of a criminal offence. Examples include 
possession offences of strict liability.  
Duff overlooks a key point. In this part of my book, I was arguing that the unified 
theory of punishment that I defend takes a distinctive view about the relation between crime 
and punishment. I argue that the crimes should be understood as violations of rights and 
punishments is an attempt to restore them. In some cases no such restoration may be 
necessary and this is one way pardons might be justified on my view. But if punishment is 
about maintaining a system of rights where crimes are punished in proportion to their 
centrality within this wider system, then what to make of cases where clear public dangers 
exist but may lack culpability? My point is that culpability may not be required to justify the 
distribution of punishment, including (but not restricted to) cases like this. 
Finally, Duff provides a narrow criticism of my fairly extensive rejection of 
expressivist and communicative theories, including his own theory. Duff focuses on my 
discussion of Feinberg’s distinction between punishment and a penalty where punishment 
refers to hard treatment such as prison and penalty refers to sanctions. Duff claims this 
distinction is important and can be made where a sanction ‘is intended to convey a formal 
censure’—and this is true of both hard treatment and ‘non-custodial’ sanctions.12 
But this attempted defence concedes my argument. I argue that Feinberg’s distinction 
between punishment as hard treatment and penalties as other forms of sanctions is drawn too 
sharply because the expression of public censure can be present in sanctions other than 
imprisonment. I argue this might even be true with verbal warnings. Duff now appears to 
accept my criticism, but his reason for continuing to see a clear distinction anyway is at best 
unclear. Moreover, Duff overlooks a key point in my argument that punishments in practice 
rarely take the form of a prison sentence or a monetary fine or some other sanction. Instead, 
two or more might be imposed together as the punishment of an offender: so actual court 
outcomes for an offender can include a combination of a fine, suspended sentence, 
community order and perhaps others. Our choice is not hard treatment or an alternative, but 
often which package of penal options are justified for an offender. I argued it was difficult to 
see how some, but not all, parts of the same punishment could rest on different justificatory 
bases between expressivist and non-expressivist forms. This line is drawn too sharp because 
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any (justified) punishment expresses public censure for illegal conduct although each may 
differ in degree, at least metaphorically and perhaps only metaphorically. But this is a 
mistake that could have been avoided if legal punishment was more closely tied to the 
criminal law and sentencing policy. 
Dempsey on coherence and expressivism 
Dempsey raises two main concerns with Punishment. First, she is critical of the role and 
importance of coherence in my account of punishment. She rightly notes that I would reject a 
‘Pick-a-Mix’ theory of punishment where we simply select any consideration for justifying 
punishment that we favour or reject punishment altogether for its lack of justification.
13
 
Dempsey notes that my criticism of the Model Penal Code is that it is a kind of Pick-a-Mix 
theory. The Model Penal Code says at §1.02: 
(2) The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of 
offenders are: 
a. to prevent the commission of offences; 
b. to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders; 
c. to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment; 
d. to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on 
convictions of an offence; 
e. to differentiate offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment. 
The Model Penal Code is a kind of Pick-a-Mix ‘theory’ of punishment because it offers 
multiple penal purposes which may clash with one another and without any structure for how 
any potential clashes can be managed, if not avoided. Moreover, the penal purposes listed in 
the Model Penal Code may be commendable, but why these particular purposes? How should 
they be considered when applied to particular cases? Missing is a justification of these parts 
to punishment’s justification as a whole. 
Dempsey does not disagree with my critique per se, but rather my alternative. She 
says: 
What is it that makes the unified theory unified? Brooks’ explanation is opaque. He 
claims that “[t]he unified theory of punishment overcomes this problem” of 
incoherence because “[i]t addresses desert, proportionality, and other penal goals [as] 
they come together within a larger framework.” To this point in his explanation, we 
must take it on trust. The unified theory is unified because Brooks keeps telling us it 
is.
14
 
She concludes: ‘Brooks offers no account of how this cohering relation between multiple 
penal goals is achieved under the unified theory’.15 For Dempsey, there appears little, if any, 
substantive difference between Pick-a-Mix theories like the Model Penal Code and my 
unified theory of punishment. 
It is worth reconsidering how the unified theory is unified. Recall the importance of 
the link between crime and punishment for my account: there is no justified punishment for 
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an unjustified crime. I claim that crimes should be understood as a kind of rights violation. 
Punishment is justified for the restoration and maintenance of rights. Desert can captured by 
the importance that someone has violated, for example. Following Alan Brudner, I argue this 
view of ‘legal retributivism’ overcomes problems found with Legal Moralism’s ‘moral 
retributivism’.16 Penal principles such as crime reduction or rehabilitation can be justified 
insofar as they can contribute to the restoration and maintenance of rights threatened by 
crime. Proportionality is determined by considering the centrality of the right affected.
17
 
Dempsey rightly notes that this view of proportionality concedes that some communities will 
view the relation between crimes and punishments differently from others. For the unified 
theory of punishment, this is not problematic per se and perhaps inevitable. It may also help 
us understand how society’s set their punishments as an indication for how those who set 
them view their corresponding crimes with potentially interesting implications over time that 
I do not consider. 
Let me use an example to illustrate, such as theft. This offence is a violation of 
another’s right to possess property. The amount of justified punishment for the thief depends 
on a consideration of which possible outcomes are most likely to yield best the restoration 
and maintenance of rights. Outcomes may not be exclusively preventative or rehabilitative: 
the reformed offender may wish to avoid the threat of the state imposing further rehabilitation 
costs in addition to his recognising he should avoid such activities anyway. And it is the case 
that some communities will choose more punitive outcomes than others, but the unified 
theory attempts an explanation: these differences can be justified because the context matters. 
A community under threat because of invasion or civil war is likely to become more 
threatened by criminal acts like theft than other communities enjoying a secure peace. This is 
not relativism, but contexualism (if it should have a name) because context matters. We can 
avoid a narrow preoccupation with whether one aim versus another is satisfied where we can 
view them more like a toolbox to help us achieve a restoration of rights. This gives 
theoretical coherence to why these aims or purposes should be included (answer: because 
they can help us achieve our goal of restoring and protecting rights), but unlikely to provide 
any specific determination of precisely which package of possible outcomes should be 
decided. But this is no more a problem for the unified theory of punishment than alternatives, 
where they run into problems of how much might be ‘deserved’ or what punishment will 
likely sufficiently deter. 
Dempsey’s second concern is that expressivist theories of punishment can give me the 
unified coherence I’m after and a better alternative. Punishment as the expression of public 
censure ‘is an auxiliary reason that picks out punishment as a particularly effective way to 
realize deterrent, rehabilitative, and displacement value’.18 Dempsey claims that 
understanding punishment as expressivist sends a message to offender and, as a message to 
offenders, is thought to communicate some deterrent value. The idea seems to be that if a 
message is not communicated expressly to a particular individual then it might lack a 
deterrence effect. I’m unsure about this. Nor do I see that this is how deterrence is more 
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effective, and not what I call macrodeterrence (general deterrence) or microdeterrence 
(specific deterrence) modes. Dempsey further claims that expressivism captures retributive 
values in communicating a punishment as ‘for his crime’ to offenders.19 
I have two concerns with this proposal. The first is whether expressivism is a hybrid 
theory, in fact. This is considered in chapter 6 of my book and not substantively addressed 
here (or by Duff who is the principle target of my critique). Expressivism may claim to 
achieve multiple penal purposes, but they aim to satisfy only one. No expressivist argues that 
any offender should be punished any more than deserved. It is not implausible to imagine a 
scenario where an offender who has committed an especially notorious, well publicised crime 
would receive a lesser sentence if punished for only what is deserved than receive the full 
brunt of vivid public anger. This causes a particular difficulty for expressivists because they 
commit themselves to the importance of the public’s communication of displeasure while 
only supporting punishments that meet a different test of retributivist desert. And so I argue 
in Punishment that expressivists—to quote Duff—hold the view that punishment ‘must…be 
understood in retributive terms’.20 
My second concern is whether expressivist theories of punishment are even theories 
of punishment. This is because if public condemnation is what matters, then public 
condemnation might justify any range of outcomes that may have more to do with who 
people are or represent than what they have done. Again, expressivists seem to fall back on 
retributivist justifications and it remains unclear what distinctive difference public displeasure 
brings to our thinking about punishment where it is held that the only permissible penal 
outcomes must be deserved.  
Dempsey claims expressivism can help provide me with the unified theory I am 
looking for. But there are questions about expressivism’s genuine distinctiveness in practice 
and whether it even is the hybrid theory it presents itself to be. One illustration of this is 
Duff’s discussion of punishment as secular penance. What is said to be distinctive about 
Duff’s view is that punishment is not only a matter of we, the public, expressing our 
condemnation of a criminal act in sentencing an offender, but punishment is also a matter of 
the offender communicating to we, the public, an apology through serving a prison sentence. 
This second part about communication is what makes the view a communicative theory of 
punishment and not merely an expressivist theory. But offenders need not do anything at all 
beyond serve the prison sentence they are compelled to endure by the state. It is bewildering 
to me how it can be claimed secular penance is happening in communicating some message 
to the public where the offender is coerced and may not, in fact, communicate or express 
anything at all.
21
 So I am not yet persuaded expressivist theories of punishment are the 
answer. 
Lippke on negative retributivism 
In Punishment, I target the idea of positive retribution understood as the view that desert is 
necessary and sufficient for punishment. If an offender can be found to deserve punishment, 
then this is sufficient to distribute punishment to him. I claim this ‘standard view’ of 
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retribution is part of ‘a rich, venerable tradition’ that includes a variety of different ideas 
about how retribution might be understood.
22
 
While positive retribution understands desert as necessary and sufficient for 
punishment, negative retribution sees desert as necessary, but not sufficient: ‘the severity of 
punishment may be determined by factors beyond desert, such as favourable consequences’.23 
In my discussion, I note that ‘both [positive and negative] retributivisms might endorse 
similar punishments, but with different justifications’.24 They each might punish the same 
offender differently, but I do not say or suggest that either would punish a thief more than a 
murderer.
25
 Lippke claims that negative retributivism has two constraints: the first forbids 
punishing the innocent and the second forbids ‘disproportionate’ punishment of the guilty. 
Lippke says my characterisation captures the first, but not the second although it should also 
be clear that nothing I say about negative retributivism contravenes the second constraint 
either.
26
 
My critique of negative retribution argues that it is a type of rule utilitarianism, ‘and 
perhaps with all the concerns that rule utilitarianism attracts’.27 The main concern is ‘that the 
justification for the rules that constrain desired consequences may differ from the justification 
for why we should pursue these consequences’.28 For example, if desert is so important for 
selecting who might be punished, why should it not play the most important, if not only, role 
in determining the punishment’s amount? Or if non-desert factors are so important that they 
should play the most prominent role, then why be constrained by desert if it inhibited pursuit 
of such non-desert factors? In Punishment, I argue that ‘perhaps there is good reason to 
distribute punishment in a particular way and a different good reason to justify the practice of 
punishment. What we require is some third reason to justify how these reasons come 
together, if negative retributivism is to be a theoretically coherent theory of punishment’.29 
My conclusion is that negative retributivist accounts have lacked this theoretical coherence.  
Lippke’s negative retributivism claims the general justifying aim of legal punishment 
is crime reduction, but subject to the retributivist constraints concerning we only punish the 
guilty and not disproportionately so.
30
 So how important are non-retributivist factors? We 
require retributivist desert because it is necessary for justified punishment on this view. But 
any justified punishment must also be proportionate—specifically, proportionate to the 
retributivist desert an offender possesses.  
So how is Lippke’s negative retributivism not positive retributivism where crime 
reduction plays no part? Lippke admits his understanding of negative retribution is ‘a more 
retributively-flavored theory of legal punishment’ than it is often believed to be.31 While 
acknowledging that there might be some exceptional circumstances where individuals are 
found to be so dangerous that their imprisonment beyond their original sentence might be 
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warranted on some views of negative retributivism, it is unclear on what grounds this would 
be true for Lippke especially where he appears not to accept this as a problem for his own 
view.
32
 
The only comment about non-desert factors playing some role in his theory arises in 
his discussion about how punishment as a practice ought not to degrade those punished. 
Lippke states that this ‘non-degradation constraint’ is ‘like the more familiar retributive 
constraints’ and so does appear to exclusive to negative retributivism and not available to 
positive retributivism.
33
 He says: ‘Put simply, we will see less crime in the future if offenders 
are not degraded (as the retributive constraint enjoins) but also prodded and helped to be 
morally responsible’.34 In other words, if we punish offenders who are deserving and to the 
degree deserved, we should recognise that our imposition of punishment should attempt to 
enable offender rehabilitation by not degrading prisoners and developing their sense of moral 
responsibility. Rather than elaborating negative retributivism, Lippke appears to defend a 
position similar to positive retributivism. He avoids the problem of theoretical incoherence I 
highlighted with negative retributivist accounts by marginalising any role played by crime 
reduction. Note that the reason we should not punish disproportionately—either too much or 
too little than deserved within a range—is because of concerns that it might damage an 
offender’s sense of moral responsibility. Note further that the reason we should not degrade 
offenders is because of the same concern. An offender’s lack of moral responsibility is not 
simply a failure to rehabilitate and risk of reoffending, but primarily a failure to take 
sufficiently seriously the link between desert and punishment. However, it is claimed a 
retributivist justification and imposition of punishment should contribute to less criminal 
offending because there should be sufficient importance placed on developing an offender’s 
moral responsibility. 
Let me highlight this important point before turning to other concerns. Lippke 
convinces me here and elsewhere on many points in legal theory—and chiefly on how our 
theories of punishment too often fail to account for their relation to practices. Lippke and I 
may disagree on how much of a negatively retributivist view he presents here, but I accept 
that any retributivist theory of punishment ought to share the concerns about an offender’s 
moral responsibility raised first by him.
35
 
There are two striking features of Lippke’s account not already touched on. Note 
Lippke’s claim that punishment should help to make offenders ‘more morally responsible’.36 
This position appears to echo the claim that punishment should be rehabilitative through 
some form of moral education. The best exponent of this view is Jean Hampton: 
Thus, according to moral education theory, punishment is not intended as a way of 
conditioning a human being to do what society wants her to do (in the way that an 
animal is conditioned by an electrified fence to stay within a pasture); rather, the 
theory maintains that punishment is intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer that 
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the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should 
not be done for that reason.
37
 
Both Lippke and Hampton appear to share the view that punishment should aim to make 
offenders more morally responsible. If successful, then offenders will refrain from future 
offending. Through educating offenders about their criminal wrongs as a kind (or kinds) of 
moral wrongs, we can reduce crimes by improving moral responsibility and awareness. 
This view rests on an important mistake highlighted by my discussion in Punishment. 
The mistake is that not all crimes are immoral and not all immorality is criminal. There is a 
‘justice gap’ too often overlooked between where moral education might be a relevant 
possibility and those crimes for which it is not.
38
 This gap speaks to the distinction of mala in 
se crimes and mala prohibita crimes. The former are thought wrongs independent of their 
criminalisation by law; the latter are thought wrongs because of their criminalisation. Crimes 
commonly understood as kinds of mala in se are murder and theft. Mala prohibita crimes 
may include drug and traffic offences as well as prostitution although this category is more 
controversial. My first point is that if there is such a distinction to be made then it is clear not 
all crimes are moral wrongs and so Lippke’s (and Hampton’s) aim to rehabilitate through 
heightened moral sensibility might be irrelevant or fall short.  
But even if we reject there are mala prohibita crimes, then it remains true that most 
offences included in the criminal law are strict liability offences where culpability is 
irrelevant. The bare fact that someone drove a car on a street above a speed limit is necessary 
and sufficient to justify a conviction for a traffic offence—and excessive speeding can lead to 
imprisonment lest this be seen as a trivial illustration. My point is that if not all criminal 
wrongs are moral wrongs, then moral education aimed at raising sufficient awareness of an 
offender’s moral wrongdoing in offending misses its target. For Lippke, ‘we will see less 
crime in future’, in part, if offenders are ‘helped to be more morally responsible’ (5). But if 
the issue is instead legal responsibility (and not moral responsibility), such a crime reduction 
effort may underperform or even ineffective. 
Now let us turn to Lippke’s discussion of my unified theory of punishment. While we 
agree on the important link between rights and punishment, there are issues worth clarifying 
further. First, he claims that I am ‘on the right track in pointing to a theory of human rights 
and the protection of such rights within a legal scheme as providing some of the conceptual 
and normative backdrop for a theory of legal punishment’ (7).  
This mistakes my use of rights for human rights. I understand these differently 
whereby human rights—from my explicitly non-natural law perspective—are inclusive of 
those human rights found in international agreements, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights or the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Rights are different and 
represent a community’s recognition of freedoms worthy of protection, and may include a 
special acknowledgement of human rights. I argue that ‘the criminal law aims at the 
protection of individual legal rights. Our legal rights are substantial freedoms worthy of 
protection for each member’.39 I further clarify my views on the relation between freedom 
and rights by claiming it is ‘broadly consistent with some versions of the capabilities 
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approach, but note that the view of freedom used here may be consistent with several 
different theories of freedom’.40 
This is a key point because it makes clear that the kind of rights I am discussion are 
not human rights per se. One reason would be that it is unclear that every part of the criminal 
law we might want to include in our criminal law is concerned with human rights alone (that 
may have a more universal character) than individual legal rights (that might differ from one 
political community to the next). It is clear that we have rights of movement that can pertain 
to any defensible view of traffic offences, but it is far from clear how they relate to human 
rights any better. 
This point matters because my unified theory links the proportionality of punishment 
to the centrality of the right infringed or threatened by a crime. Lippke claims I run with three 
different possible meanings of what a restoration of rights might entail. The first is about any 
rights, such as to restitution and including conduct addressed by private law.
41
 While it is true 
that rights are protected by more areas of law than the criminal law alone, my focus is clearly 
on the criminal only. Issues about contract and tort law are interesting, but not part of my 
examination of punishment and its justification. The second possible meaning Lippke claims 
to find is a ‘censuring aspect’ whereby punishment has some expressivist function.42 As 
should now be clear, I do not deny that punishment can be understood—at least 
metaphorically—as an expression of public censure, but my view rejects expressivist theories 
Finally, Lippke claims my discussion of restoration also appears to support the view that 
punishment aims to reassure the public that rights shall be protected and laws reliably 
enforced. This is broadly more accurate of my view than the first two which I’d reject. But 
Lippke then raises the concern that punishment ‘curtails or infringes the rights of offenders’ 
and so seems counterproductive as a project of rights protection.
43
 My argument is that 
through the use of punishment it can be possible to best maintain and protect our rights. 
Limiting another’s freedom by requiring treatment for serious conditions that have 
contributed to persistent reoffending is a means to the maintenance and protection of rights 
not only for the rest of us should reoffending be reduced, if not stopped, but also for the 
offender. Lippke’s criticism would have greater force if punishment was an end in itself. If 
we punished for its own sake, then it is clearer how restricting rights can pose problems. But 
if we punish as a means to another good like securing rights, then restricting rights might be 
justified as a measure of last resort where there is no better alternative to protecting and 
maintaining rights. And as it should be.  
Conclusion 
I am especially grateful to Duff, Dempsey and Lippke for these thoughtful and largely 
constructive comments on Punishment. While I can’t say that I am convinced my views on 
punishment should change, these critiques provide a welcome opportunity to spell out in 
further detail the reasons behind the arguments I offer. I hope they may even shed some 
further light. 
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 In conclusion, I would like to comment further on two points that arose during a 
conference organised by the editors of Philosophy and Public Issues held at LUISS this past 
spring. The first point is I was pushed to say more about why punishment should be unified. 
On the one hand, I appear to align theory to practice. I note that the Model Penal Code and 
sentencing guidelines across multiple jurisdictions include multiple penal purposes, but 
without a satisfactory framework for resolving any conflicts between these purposes when 
applied in practice. So is the unified theory about justifying our practices? This would seem 
to fit with my broadly Hegel-inspired work, as Hegel saw his philosophy as an effort at 
discerning the rationality in the word.
44
 Am I doing the same? On the other hand, I appear to 
be trying to provide a coherent theory about how a unified theory of punishment is possible. 
So is my aim to provide a theory of punishment or to justify our existing practices? 
The short answer is a bit of both. My view is that a coherent, unified theory of 
punishment is possible and part of its wider importance is it can offer us a possible 
framework to guide existing sentencing policy. But it is not the bare existence of these 
policies that provides my primary philosophical motivations, but they are also not irrelevant. 
A unified theory is not only possible, but it also highlights a neglected tradition of Hegelian 
thought so there is some importance for the history of ideas from my theory of punishment as 
well.
45
 But I do not assume our practices are correct or desirable. We should not be interested 
in a unified theory because our practices cover plural purposes, but instead because these 
practices get right that these purposes are worth having for sentencing—so what we require is 
a new framework which my unified theory attempts to provide.  
A second point concerns the movement of travel. I focus on rights to be protected and 
move from there. But it might be objected that I should start with wrongs and go to rights. 
The problem is that I run a risk of resting my view on an overinflated view of rights.
46
 While 
I accept that this risk is a concern, I remain unconvinced the alternative mentioned would 
better avoid this problem.  
A book is more than a series of claims and arguments. I spent several years 
researching, constructing and rewriting the text to cover necessary ground and clarify my 
positions. After such a major effort, it is immensely satisfying to receive such robust and 
wide-ranging commentary from so many philosophers I highly respect. I hope these 
comments go some way to pay back this kindness.
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